The threat actor was also able to copy a backup of customer vault data from the encrypted storage container which is stored in a proprietary binary format that contains both unencrypted data, such as website URLs, as well as fully-encrypted sensitive fields such as website usernames and passwords, secure notes, and form-filled data. To date, we have determined that once the cloud storage access key and dual storage container decryption keys were obtained, the threat actor copied information from backup that contained basic customer account information and related metadata including company names, end-user names, billing addresses, email addresses, telephone numbers, and the IP addresses from which customers were accessing the LastPass service. That software marketing exec is now gobbling Tums like they were candy. And another, and another and another and another … I had almost lost track until I read today’s blog post from LastPass, blandly titled 'Notice of Recent Security Incident.' It starts out, “We recently notified you that an unauthorized party gained access to a third-party cloud-based storage service, which LastPass uses to store archived backups of our production data.” Software marketing execs have nightmares about having to write things like “Record traffic, plus a rush of people to make password changes is more than we can currently handle.”Īnd then there was another incident.

Can you trust lastpass